| FT-54021-06 | Research Programs: Summer Stipends | Raffaella De Rosa | Descartes' Theory of Sensory Representation | 6/1/2006 - 8/31/2006 | $5,000.00 | Raffaella | | De Rosa | | | | Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Newark | Newark | NJ | 07104-3010 | USA | 2006 | History of Philosophy | Summer Stipends | Research Programs | 5000 | 0 | 5000 | 0 |
I am interested in two related issues raised by Descartes’ account of sensation. First, contra the standard view, I am interested in establishing that, according to Descartes, sensations of color and the like are intrinsically intentional. Second, I address the following question. What is Descartes’ account of the representationality of sensation? I discuss various attempts in the literature to understand Descartes’ account in light of internalist, causal and teleological theories of mental content. I argue that none of these proposals is tenable and conclude by tendering an alternative account of Descartes’ view on the nature of sensory representation. |