Theoretical Continuity and Approximate Truth (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: Theoretical Continuity and Approximate Truth
Author: Dana Tulodziecki
Abstract: I presented a paper to the Philosophy Department at the University of Cincinnati that drew on material produced during the grant period. Here is the abstract of the paper I presented: The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) seeks to undercut the realist’s alleged connection between success and (approximate) truth by arguing that highly successful, yet wildly false theories are typical of the history of science. Realist responses to the PMI try to rehabilitate this connection by stressing various kinds of continuity between earlier and later theories. I argue that the extant realist responses are inadequate, by showing – through the example of the 19th century miasma theory of disease – that there are cases of genuinely successful, yet false theories that do not exhibit any of the required realist continuities. Moreover, I argue that this case is problematic for realists regardless of whether the miasma theory is approximately true or not.
Date Range: 06 November 2020
Location: Colloquium Talk, Philosophy Department, University of Cincinnati, via Zoom (due to pandemic)

Draft of chapter of book (as specified in the rest of the report) (Book Section)
Title: Draft of chapter of book (as specified in the rest of the report)
Author: Dana Tulodziecki
Abstract: Since this is a draft of a chapter of a book, there is no abstract (I will update the database when the book has progressed further).
Year: 2020
Book Title: Scientific Progress without Truth (in progress)

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