Program

Research Programs: Fellowships for University Teachers

Period of Performance

8/1/2012 - 7/31/2013

Funding Totals

$50,400.00 (approved)
$50,388.98 (awarded)


Omissions: Metaphysics, Agency, and Responsibility

FAIN: FA-56423-12

Randolph Kent Clarke
Florida State University (Tallahassee, FL 32306-0001)

Philosophical theories of agency and responsibility have focused primarily on actions--on things such as firing a gun or telling a lie. Omissions have received relatively little attention, despite the fact that they constitute an important aspect of our agency. Omitting to act, like acting, commonly has consequences; and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy--and sometimes legally liable--for our omissions, just as we can be for our actions. There is currently no comprehensive account of omissions. The book I am writing will provide such a view. The main questions to be addressed are: what is an omission, what is it to intentionally omit to do something, and under what conditions is an agent morally or legally responsible for an omission. The aim is to add significantly to our understanding of human agency. The book will be of interest to theorists working on freedom, responsibility, and law.





Associated Products

Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility (Book)
Title: Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility
Author: Randolph Clarke
Abstract: Philosophical theories of agency and responsibility have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. Omitting or refraining, like acting, can have consequences, good and bad. And we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for omitting or refraining. However, omitting and refraining are not simply special cases of action; they require their own distinctive treatment. In Omissions, Randolph Clarke offers the first comprehensive account of these phenomena, addressing three main questions: What is an omission? What is it to intentionally not do a certain thing? And what does it take to be morally responsible for omitting or refraining? Clarke examines the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction between doing and allowing, and the distinction in law between act and omission. With its attention to a previously neglected topic, Omissions broadens our understanding of human agency.
Year: 2014
Publisher: New York: Oxford University Press
Type: Single author monograph
Copy sent to NEH?: Yes

Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act (Book Section)
Title: Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act
Author: Randolph Clarke
Editor: David Palmer
Abstract: na
Year: 2014
Publisher: New York: Oxford University Press
Book Title: Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates

Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission (Book Section)
Title: Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission
Author: Randolph Clarke
Editor: Alfred R. Mele
Abstract: na
Year: 2015
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Book Title: Surrounding Free Will

Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments (Article)
Title: Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments
Author: Chris Zarpentine
Author: Randolph Clarke
Author: Joshua Shepherd
Author: John Stigall
Author: Robyn Repko Waller
Abstract: Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people’s causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to apply equally to actions and omissions.
Year: 2015
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: Philosophical Psychology

Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions (Book Section)
Title: Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions
Author: Randolph Clarke
Editor: Samuel C. Rickless
Editor: Dana Kay Nelkin
Abstract: This chapter advances the view that we can bear direct responsibility for unwitting omissions.
Year: 2017
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Book Title: The Ethics and Law of Omissions

Negative Agency (Book Section)
Title: Negative Agency
Author: Randolph Clarke
Editor: Luca Ferrero
Abstract: na
Year: 2022
Publisher: Routledge
Book Title: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency

Responsibility for Acts and Omissions (Book Section)
Title: Responsibility for Acts and Omissions
Author: Randolph Clarke
Editor: Derk Pereboom
Editor: Dana Kay Nelkin
Abstract: na
Year: 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Book Title: The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility

Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists (Article)
Title: Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists
Author: Randolph Clarke
Abstract: Several theories of causation rule out causation of or by lacks, omissions, or absences of things. They thereby conflict with much of what we think and say about what causes what. This article proposes a modification of one kind of theory, causal dispositionalism, so that it accepts absence causation while retaining a fundamental commitment of dispositionalism.
Year: 2018
Primary URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.16
Access Model: Subscription
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Publisher: Cambridge U. Press