The Two Affections of Will: From Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109) to John Duns Scotus (d. 1308)

FAIN: FA-57408-13

Stephen D. Dumont
University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame, IN 46556-4635)

This project traces the history of the theory of the 'two affections of the will' from its first occurrence in Anselm of Canterbury to its most influential development in John Duns Scotus. The distinction places within the will two inclinations, one for happiness and the other for justice, establishing the will as a self-moving, autonomous power and the locus of morality. In its particular formulation by Scotus, who makes the affection for justice the primary sense of freedom, the doctrine of the two affections is seen to have broken from the eudaimonistic ethics of the Greeks. I reconstruct the largely ignored history of the two affections as it was inserted into the mainstream debates over free will in the thirteenth century, which then served as a main source for Scotus’s own theory. I give a historically more accurate interpretation of the two affections theory in Scotus and address its commonly assigned role in his ethics as rendering the moral law naturally accessible.

Associated Products

James of Viterbo on the Will (Book Section)
Title: James of Viterbo on the Will
Author: Stephen D. Dumont
Editor: Andre Côté
Editor: Martin Pickavé
Abstract: This article examines the theory of the will by the thirteenth century Parisian master, James of Viterbo. Of primary concern in the study is the adoption by James of Anselm's doctrine of the two affections of the will, which is the most ambitious prior to Duns Scotus. Comparison of James's theory of the will and the extent of his voluntarisim is made to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines. 26,000 words.
Year: 2018
Access Model: Subscription or direct purchase
Publisher: E. J. Brill
Book Title: A Companion to James of Viterbo

The Background to Duns Scotus’s Theory of the Two Affections of the Will (Book Section)
Title: The Background to Duns Scotus’s Theory of the Two Affections of the Will
Author: Stephen D. Dumont
Editor: Giorgio Pini
Abstract: One of the most active areas of recent research into Duns Scotus has been on his theory of free will. Of particular interest has been his appropriation of Anselm of Canterbury’s innovation that the will has a twofold affection or inclination, one for justice (affectio iustitiae) and the other for happiness (affectio commodi). In adopting Anselm’s theory, Scotus’s made the affection for justice the primary source of freedom in the will by construing it as a restraint on the natural drive for happiness. This development in Scotus has been seen as important as a proto-Kantian rejection of eudaimonism by making justice rather than happiness the center of morality. The aim of this study is to reconstruct the largely ignored historical and theoretical development of Anselm’s doctrine that was the immediate source of Scotus’s own version of the theory.
Year: 2018
Access Model: Subscription or direct purchase
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Book Title: Interpreting Duns Scotus

James of Viterbo on Free Will (Conference Paper/Presentation)
Title: James of Viterbo on Free Will
Author: Stephen D. Dumont
Abstract: This was a lecture given at a conference held at the Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa for the contributors to the volume "A Companion to James of Viterbo," an Augustinian master of theology at the University of Paris during the end of the thirteenth century. My lecture outlined his theory of free will, which was based on the doctrine of "the two affections of will" originated by Anselm of Canterbury. The appropriation of the Anselmian doctrine by James was one of the most original in the medieval period prior to its important development by John Duns Scotus.
Date: 05/28/2014
Conference Name: The Philosophy of James of Viterbo

Towards a History of Anselm's Two Affections of the Will: The Background to Scotus (Conference Paper/Presentation)
Title: Towards a History of Anselm's Two Affections of the Will: The Background to Scotus
Author: Stephen D. Dumont
Abstract: This paper identifies the immediate sources from which Duns Scotus constructed his own, much discussed version of Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of the two affections of the will. I show that Scotus developed his theory not directly from Anselm but from the late-thirteenth-century debates at Paris over free will and, in particular, from Henry of Ghent’s lengthy, critical analysis of Anselm’s doctrine. The immediate occasion for Henry’s extensive analysis of Anselm’s two affections was the specific solution to the free will problem advanced by the Franciscan John of Murro, who attempted to merge Anselm with Aquinas’s resolution based on his innovative distinction between the exercise and specification of an act. Henry rejected Murro’s interpretation of Aquinas, just as he had forcefully rejected Aquinas’s original solution, but did so only after a treatise length commentary on Anselm. It was from Henry’s analysis of Anselm, the first and most substantial in the scholastic period, that Scotus’s took his own theory of the two affections, including his controversial claim that the affection for justice is the “native freedom of the will.” Henry’s treatment permits both a more informed interpretation of Scotus’s somewhat elliptical discussion of Anselm’s two affections as well as a more accurate estimation of his contribution.
Date: 07/30/2015
Conference Name: Boston Colloquy in Historical Theology, Boston College

The Background to Duns Scotus’s Theory of the Two Affections of Will (Conference Paper/Presentation)
Title: The Background to Duns Scotus’s Theory of the Two Affections of Will
Author: Stephen D. Dumont
Abstract: This paper identifies the immediate sources from which Duns Scotus constructed his own, much discussed version of Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of the two affections of the will. I show that Scotus developed his theory not directly from Anselm but from the late-thirteenth-century debates at Paris over free will and, in particular, from Henry of Ghent’s lengthy, critical analysis of Anselm’s doctrine. The immediate occasion for Henry’s extensive analysis of Anselm’s two affections was the specific solution to the free will problem advanced by the Franciscan John of Murro, who attempted to merge Anselm with Aquinas’s resolution based on his innovative distinction between the exercise and specification of an act. Henry rejected Murro’s interpretation of Aquinas, just as he had forcefully rejected Aquinas’s original solution, but did so only after a treatise length commentary on Anselm. It was from Henry’s analysis of Anselm, the first and most substantial in the scholastic period, that Scotus’s took his own theory of the two affections, including his controversial claim that the affection for justice is the “native freedom of the will.” Henry’s treatment permits both a more informed interpretation of Scotus’s somewhat elliptical discussion of Anselm’s two affections as well as a more accurate estimation of his contribution
Date: 03/13/2015
Conference Name: John Duns Scotus and the Legacy of his Thought, Medieval Academy of America Annual Meeting

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