Thought Crime in Anglo-American Law and Legal Philosophy

FAIN: FEL-268081-20

Gabriel S. Mendlow
Regents of the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1015)

Research and writing leading to a book on the criminalization of thought in Anglo-American law.

Thought crime is dystopian fiction, not contemporary law. Or so we’re told. Yet our legal system actually punishes thought regularly, while our legal philosophy fails to explain what’s wrong with thought crime or to recognize it for what it is. Anglo-American law quietly embraces a style of criminalization where statutes nominally prohibit acts but actually punish offenders for their underlying thoughts. This practice flouts critical but overlooked principles of political morality, principles concerning freedom of mind and the relationship between punishment and policing. Properly conceived, the controversy over thought crime is in fact just one battle in a larger war, a war fought on terrain common to many disciplines in the humanities. It is a war that pits our professed commitment to freedom of thought against our often legitimate interest in regulating the mind—not just in matters of criminal intent, but also in matters of education, mental health, preventive detention, and beyond.