Program

Research Programs: Summer Stipends

Period of Performance

6/15/2020 - 8/14/2020

Funding Totals

$6,000.00 (approved)
$6,000.00 (awarded)


Scientific Progress without Truth: Expanding the Notion of Epistemic Success in Science

FAIN: FT-270269-20

Dana Tulodziecki
Purdue University (West Lafayette, IN 47907-2040)

Writing one chapter of a book that will argue for a new way of thinking about scientific progress.

I seek funding to write a formative section of a book-length original research monograph, tentatively titled 'Scientific Progress without Truth', to be submitted to a major university press by the end of 2020. This book addresses the question of what makes our scientific theories so successful, despite the fact that virtually all of them turn out to be false, as is shown by the historical record. I develop a new notion of scientific progress – divorced from the traditional notion of truth – that is based on non-evidential features of actual scientific practice which, I argue, play a central role in contributing to our theories’ epistemic value.





Associated Products

Theoretical Continuity and Approximate Truth (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: Theoretical Continuity and Approximate Truth
Author: Dana Tulodziecki
Abstract: I presented a paper to the Philosophy Department at the University of Cincinnati that drew on material produced during the grant period. Here is the abstract of the paper I presented: The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) seeks to undercut the realist’s alleged connection between success and (approximate) truth by arguing that highly successful, yet wildly false theories are typical of the history of science. Realist responses to the PMI try to rehabilitate this connection by stressing various kinds of continuity between earlier and later theories. I argue that the extant realist responses are inadequate, by showing – through the example of the 19th century miasma theory of disease – that there are cases of genuinely successful, yet false theories that do not exhibit any of the required realist continuities. Moreover, I argue that this case is problematic for realists regardless of whether the miasma theory is approximately true or not.
Date Range: 06 November 2020
Location: Colloquium Talk, Philosophy Department, University of Cincinnati, via Zoom (due to pandemic)

Draft of chapter of book (as specified in the rest of the report) (Book Section)
Title: Draft of chapter of book (as specified in the rest of the report)
Author: Dana Tulodziecki
Abstract: Since this is a draft of a chapter of a book, there is no abstract (I will update the database when the book has progressed further).
Year: 2020
Book Title: Scientific Progress without Truth (in progress)