The Knowledge Account of Assertion

FAIN: FT-59416-12

John Turri
University of Waterloo (Waterloo, Canada N2A4L6 Canada)

"I myself," wrote George Bernard Shaw, "though I am ... a professional thinker, have to content myself with second-hand opinions on a great many most important subjects on which I can neither form an opinion of my own nor criticize opinions I take from others." We depend on the word of others for much important information we rely on every day. Assertion is the main way we communicate information to one another. Given that we rely so pervasively on assertions, it is natural to wonder, what standards ought our assertions, and we as assertors, live up to? This question lies at the heart of my proposal, and is one of the most intensely debated questions in contemporary philosophy. I will defend a new and improved version of the most promising answer to this question, what is known as "the knowledge account of assertion," which says that knowledge sets the standard for assertion. My research will result in a major research article and a book manuscript.

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